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INTRODUCTION

Scholastic journalists across America have long provided vital
reporting, commentary, and fresh perspective on issues of public concern. In the current age of dwindling print media,1 student journalists
2
play an ever-increasing role in investigating and reporting the news.
For instance, during the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, students called
attention to the public health failings of their school systems and documented the pandemic's impact on their communities.3 Students are
also at the heart of many of today's social change movements, speak4
ing out on issues of gun violence, global warming, and racial justice.
Students are thus well-positioned to provide both on-the-ground
* Clare R. Norins is Assistant Clinical Professor and Director of the First Amendment
Clinic at the University of Georgia School of Law. Taran Harmon-Walker is a 2021 J.D. graduate, and Navroz Tharani is a 2022 J.D. candidate, both of the University of Georgia School of
Law. 2021 J.D. graduate Nneka Ewulonu also provided excellent research and early drafting
assistance for this article.
1 See, e.g., Penelope Muse, The Expanding News Desert 1, 8-13 (2018), https://
www.cislm.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Expanding-News-Desert-10_14-Web.pdf; Victor
Pickard, Editorial, American Journalism Is Dying. Its Survival Requires Public Funds, GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2020, 8:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/19/american
-journalism-press-publishing-mcclatchy.
2 See, e.g., Taylor Blatchford, As Local Newsrooms Shrink, College JournalistsFill in the
Gaps, POYNTER (July 16, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/tech-tools/2018/as-local-newsroomsshrink-college-journalists-fill-in-the-gaps.
3 Jonathan Peters, The Legal Landscape for Frontline Student Journalists, COLUM. J. REV.
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.cjr.org/covering_thepandemic/covid-19-pandemic-student-journalists.php (noting that during the COVID-19 pandemic student journalists "have exposed campus
outbreaks and questioned reopening plans. They have documented social-distancing violations at
fraternity and sorority houses. They have tracked and explained fast-breaking changes to instructional modes and commencement events. They have demanded transparency from school administrators. And through it all they have boldly told the story of the human experience.").
4 Brenda Gonzalez, Youth Activism Is Creating Lasting Change, USC ANNENBERG RELEVANCE REP. (Nov. 11, 2020, 2:20 PM), https://annenberg.usc.edu/research/center-public-relations/usc-annenberg-relevance-report/youth-activism-creating-asting.

63

64

CIVIL RIGHTS

LAW

JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:1

reporting and editorial opinion about news-worthy issues of our time,
filling the gaps created by a shrinking professional journalism market.
Yet scholastic journalists around the country operate with varying
degrees of speech and press freedom depending on whether their state
has enacted legislation safeguarding their expression in the context of
school-sponsored media. This patchwork of protection, or more often
the lack thereof, is a direct result of the Supreme Court's 1988 deci-

sion in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.5 The Court's ruling
in that case bestowed on school officials the broad discretion to censor
expression in school-sponsored forums like student newspapers.6
Prior to Hazelwood, scholastic journalism, like other school-affiliated student speech, was protected from administrative interference
under Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.?
In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that school officials can neither
censor nor punish student speech unless it creates, or is reasonably
forecast to create, "material interference" or "substantial disruption"
of school activities, or interferes with the rights of others. 8 For two
decades, Tinker was the First Amendment standard for all students,

including those participating in school-sponsored media.9

Hazelwood, however, largely eviscerated First Amendment protection for scholastic journalists. Unlike the Tinker standard, Hazelwood requires no showing of likely substantial disruption or
interference with school activities before school officials can censor
student journalists' speech. 10 Instead, Hazelwood permits schools to
censor so long as the restriction can be claimed to relate to a "legiti5 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
6 Id. at 273.
7 393 U.S. 503 (1968).
8 Id.at 514 (noting that the Tinker plaintiffs "neither interrupted school activities nor
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion outside of
the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder. In the circumstances, our Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny their form of expression.").
9 See, e.g., Reineke v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-58 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975);
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For non-school sponsored student publications distributed at school, see Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist, 462 F.2d 960, 967-70 (5th Cir.
1972); Fujishima v. Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1972). For student publications
on a university campus, see Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d 722, 723 (4th Cir. 1973); Bazaar v.
Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd as modified en banc per curiam, 489 F.2d 225
(5th Cir. 1973); Lee v. Bd. of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1971).
10 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-76.
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,

mate pedagogical purpose."" In the 33 years since Hazelwood was
decided, lower courts have applied the "legitimate pedagogical purpose" standard so generously that students raising First Amendment
12
concerns in cases where Hazelwood applies almost always lose. As
First Amendment scholar Sonja West observes, "Schools are essentially free to censor the student press even when the speech at issue is
truthful, legally obtained, non-disruptive, and about matters of public
concern." 13
In response to Hazelwood, fourteen states have enacted legislation codifying the free-speech rights of student journalists and restoring the Tinker standard for when school administrators can interfere
with scholastic media. 14 Half of these laws were adopted as part of a
"New Voices" movement that started with the adoption of the New
Voices of North Dakota Act in 2015 and has since been championed"
by the Student Press Law Center.15 And in July 2021, New Jersey was
the fifteenth state to pass a "New Voices" bill in both houses of the'.
legislature. That bill was awaiting signature by the governor at the
time this article went to press. 16 An additional nine states have introduced, but not yet passed, "New Voices" laws: Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Iowa, Tennessee, West Virginia, and
Texas.17
This article explains why "New Voices" legislation is needed in.
every state. Part I provides an overview of First Amendment law in.
the K-12 school setting, including the highwater mark of Tinker, followed twenty years later by the low point of Hazelwood. Part II,

&

11 Id. at 273.
12 See Dan V. Kozlowski, Unchecked Deference: Hazelwood's Too Broad and Too Loose
Application in the Circuit Courts, 3 U. BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 1, 6 (2012).
13 Sonja R. west, Student Press Exceptionalism, 2 EDUc. L. & POL'Y REV. 130, 132 (2015).
14 State laws protecting the expression of student journalists were passed in the following
chronology: California in 1977; Massachusetts in 1988; Iowa in 1989; Colorado in 1990; Kansas in
1992; Arkansas in 1995; Oregon in 2007; North Dakota in 2015; Maryland and Illinois in 2016;
Vermont, Nevada, and Rhode Island in 2017; Washington in 2018. New Voices, STUDENT PRESS
L. CTR., https://splc.org/new-voices (last visited July 28, 2021).
15 See Steven Francis Listopad & Elizabeth Crisp Crawford, The Origins of New Voices
USA; A Lesson in Teaching Advocacy to Improve Teaching and Learning, 73 JOURNALISM
MASS COMMC'N EDUCATOR 469, 471 (2018); History of the Student Press Law Center, STUDENT
PRESS L. CTR., https://splc.org/history/ (last visited August 28, 2021).
16 New Voices in New Jersey, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., https://splc.org/new-voices-newjersey-2/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
17 See New Voices, STUDENT PRESs L. CTR., https://splc.org/new-voices (last visited July 28,
2021).
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using Georgia as a case study, discusses the persisting detrimental
impact of Hazelwood on student journalists, their advisers, and the
broader community. Part III then analyzes the fourteen state statutes
enacted to date that restore the Tinker standard for when schools can
censor or suppress scholastic journalism. Part III specifically highlights core areas of overlap among the state statutes and noteworthy
provisions adopted by a minority of the states, while synthesizing relevant case law interpreting these existing statutes. Part IV sets forth
recommended provisions for future "New Voices" Acts informed by
the fourteen-state survey and SPLC's model "New Voices" statute
(hereinafter "SPLC Model"). This article concludes with a call to all
states without existing state-level protections for student journalists
and their advisers to join the "New Voices" movement.
I.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT GOVERNING STUDENT PRESS
FREEDOMS

Under the First Amendment, private individuals in the United
States enjoy broad protection against government infringement of
their speech and expression. 18 These First Amendment safeguards
apply not only to actions taken by the federal government, but also to
actions taken by the states. 19 As state institutions, public schools must
therefore comply with the requirements of the First Amendment. 20
A.

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

Public school students' First Amendment rights were first recognized in the mid-20th century when, in the case of West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court held that students
could not be compelled to engage in the expressive conduct of saluting
the flag and reciting the pledge of allegiance. 21 This decision overturned the Supreme Court's ruling from just three years earlier where
the Court had upheld a school district's policy requiring students to
salute the American flag as a means of furthering the government's
18 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press...").
19 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
20 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
21 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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interest in creating national unity. 22 Striking down mandatory flag
salute and allegiance pledging in Barnette, the Court famously proclaimed that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
23
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court recognized students' First
Amendment right to engage in political speech at school in the seminal Tinker case, which arose from the following facts. In December
1965, junior high school students in Des Moines, Iowa planned to
wear black armbands to school during the December holiday season
in protest of the Vietnam War.24 When school officials learned of this,
25
Three stuthey preemptively banned wearing armbands in school.
dents, including siblings Mary Beth and John Tinker, defied the ban
and were sent home until they agreed to return without their armbands. 26 The Tinkers appealed the school's prohibition of the arm27
bands all the way to the Supreme Court. In 1969, the Court ruled
against the school district, explaining that "First Amendment rights,
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to free2
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 8 Writing for
the majority, Justice Fortas announced that schools can only punish or
censor student speech if it is reasonably forecast to cause "substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities," or if the
speech invades the rights of other students. 29 This Tinker standard,
which the Supreme Court recently affirmed in Mahanoy Area Sch.
Dist. v. B.L., 30 remains the keystone principle for when schools can
regulate or punish student speech.3 1
22
23
24
25

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595-98 (1940); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
Id.

26

Id.

27 Id. at 504-05.

28 Id. at 506.
29 Id. at 513-14.
30 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2047-48 (2021).
31 The Supreme Court recognizes the following exceptions to the Tinker standard where
schools may punish or prohibit in-school student expression without first showing a reasonable
forecast of substantial disruption: (1) vulgar or lewd speech, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); (2) speech in the context of school-sponsored expressive activities such
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier

Almost twenty years after Tinker, students' First Amendment
rights suffered a serious and lasting blow when the Supreme Court

handed down

its decision in Hazelwood School District v.

32

Kuhlmeier. There, a Hazelwood School District principal censored
two articles in a pending issue of the student newspaper: the first
focused on the effects of parents' divorce on students and the second
focused on teen pregnancy at the school. 33 Three student journalists
from the newspaper sued for violation of their First Amendment

rights. 34 Although their claims succeeded in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, on review the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the school district. 35 The Court held that a school acting as
the publisher of a student newspaper or the producer of a school play

has the right to "disassociate itself" from speech that would "substantially interfere with [its] work . .. or impinge upon the rights of other

students."36 Thus, "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 37
Additionally, the Hazelwood Court authorized a school to disallow
speech that is "ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for
immature audiences."3 8 Justice Byron R. White, writing for the majority, further urged:
A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student
speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol
use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with the
shared values of a civilized social order or to associate the school with
any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy.
Otherwise, the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling
as school media and school plays, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73
(1988); and (3) speech promoting illegal drug use, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
32 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
33 Id. at 263-64.
34 Id. at 264.
35 Id. at 265-66.
36 Id. at 271 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
37 Id. at 273.
38 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
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their role as a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
39
him to adjust normally to his environment.

Hazelwood thereby grants school officials expansive discretion to censor student journalism on any number of politically or socially relevant topics, and to veto satire, parody, or other creative writing styles,
if the student expression is "reasonably" deemed to be "inconsistent
with the shared values of a civilized order."40

II.

THE

DETRIMENTAL IMPACT OF

Hazelwood

Hazelwood's gift to school administrators of broad censorial
authority promptly curtailed student press freedoms 41 and continues
42
to negatively affect scholastic journalists and their advisers today.
The "legitimate pedagogical concerns" requirement has proven ineffective in cabining schools' discretion to censor. 43 This is illustrated by
the fact that post-Hazelwood, school officials have restricted or prohibited scholastic journalism on a wide range of newsworthy topics
including: HIV/AIDS, teenage sexuality, student alcohol and drug
39 Id. at 272 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
40 Id. Hazelwood left open whether its holding applies to school-sponsored student expression at the college and university level. Id. at 273-74, n. 7. Multiple circuit courts of appeal hold
that it does. See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733-34 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Hazelwood to
graduate student's speech about her practicum assignment); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735
(7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("Hazelwood's framework applies to subsidized student newspapers at
colleges"); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (at the university level,
Hazelwood allows regulation of curriculum-related student speech); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939,
949-51 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying Hazelwood to section of graduate student's master's thesis);
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (Hazelwood applies to collegiate
speech); Ala. Student Party v. Student Govt' Ass'n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Hazelwood in upholding "reasonable restrictions" that university placed on students
campaigning for student government).
41 In the five years following the 1988 Hazelwood decision, legal assistance requests to the
Student Press Law Center from student journalists and their advisers almost tripled, from 548 in
1987 to 1,473 in 1993. See Carol S. Lomicky, Analysis of High School Newspaper Editorials
Before and After Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: A Content Analysis Case Study, 29
J.L. & EDUC. 463, 466-67 (Oct. 2000).
42 See West, supra note 13; see also, e.g., Sommer Brugal, 'Growing Hostility' Between Student Media and Administrators,INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING WORKSHOP (Sept. 16, 2019), https://
investigativereportingworkshop.org/news/growing-hostility-between-student-media-and-administrators/; Danny Gallagher, Prosper High's Newspaper Staff Says New Principal Censored Stories, Ousted Adviser, DALL. OBSERVER (June 8, 2018), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/
4 4
censorship-at-ponder-high-riles-student-journalists-leads-to-advisers-ouster-1076 1 6.
43 See Dan V. Kozlowski, supra note 12, at 6.
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use, 4 embezzlement by a school principal, inadequate school
restrooms, student sexual orientation and gender identity, birth control, tattoos, 4 5 educational disparity between white students and stu-

dents of color, and depictions of flag burning.46
A.

Societal Harm of School Censorship

Mark Goodman and Frank LoMonte, both former executive
directors of SPLC in the post-Hazelwood era, have voiced concerns
about the negative social impact of school censorship. 47 First, in an age
where people increasingly seek their news through online forums and
social media, it is more important than ever to equip students with the
skills to identify reliable sources of information and to teach them to
value reporting that is ethical, well-sourced, and fact-checked.48
School administrators sanitizing scholastic media of sensitive or controversial topics denies students the opportunity to learn how to
responsibly and ethically investigate and write about multi-perspective, often highly relevant issues.4 9 Limiting student journalists to
writing only about "safe" and "non-offensive" subject matter not only
deprives student journalists of having a voice on salient topics but also
deprives readers of their First Amendment right to receive the information, opinions, and ideas that student journalists would otherwise
44 Bailey McGowan, 25 Years Later, a Look at One Generation Under Hazelwood, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2013), https://splc.org/2013/01/25-years-later-a-look-at-one-generation-under-hazelwood.
45 Chris Sanders, Censorship 101: Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free
Speech at Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159, 167 (2006).
46 Lahontan Valley News Editorial Board, New Voices Allows Student Journalists to Be
Heard, NEv. APPEAL (May 16, 2017), https://www.nevadaappeal.com/news/2017/may/16/newvoices-allows-student-journalists-to-be-heard.
47 See Frank LoMonte, Censorship Makes the School Look Bad: Why Courts and Educators Must Embrace the "PassionateConversation," 65 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 91, 116-18 (2021);
J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press Rights in the
Wake of Hazelwood School Districtv. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DuxE L.J. 706, 722 (1988).
48 See Dan Gillmor, Introduction: Toward a (New) Media Literacy in a Media Saturated
World, JOURNALISM AND CITIZENSHIP: NEW AGENDAS IN COMM. 1, 9-11 (2009) (advocating for
teaching critical thinking skills based on concepts of thoroughness, accuracy, fairness, independence, and transparency, without which young people will be left "adrift amid an onslaught of
media or so cynical that they will disbelieve trustworthy sources").
49 See LoMonte, supra note 47, at 117-18; Piotr S. Bobkowski & Genelle L Belmas, Mixed
Message Media: Girls' Voices and Civic Engagement in Student Journalism,10 GIRLHOOD STuo.
89, 95-97 (2017) (A survey of 453 high school journalists in North Carolina found that 41% of
female students and 28% of male students reported being told that certain topics were off-limits,
including legalizing marijuana and same-sex marriage).
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be imparting.50 This, in turn, limits readers' ability to exercise their
own expressive freedoms.5 1 Thus, Hazelwood impacts the greater
community in addition to the student journalists who are most directly
affected.

Second, Hazelwood-based

censorship conflicts with effectively

preparing youth to engage in participatory democracy.5 2 As one commentator notes, "schools create citizens to sustain our democracy by
training students to know and exercise their First Amendment rights."
5 Yet, teaching students about the importance of free speech and a
free press becomes a hollow and hypocritical lesson when, under
Hazelwood, the same students are deprived of their autonomy to
exercise those rights.54 Similarly, a report by the American Bar Association calling for state-level protections against censorship of student
journalists observes that "[m]eaningful civic education requires that
students feel safe and empowered to discuss issues of social and political concern in the responsible, accountable forum of journalistic
media.""5 However, these are the very learning opportunities that
Hazelwood authorizes schools to remove from public education.
In some instances, administrators' efforts to ban or punish student expression, including in scholastic press publications, only serve
to amplify the speech - a phenomenon known as the Streisand
50 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) ("At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern."); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969) ("It is now well established that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information and ideas.").
51 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) ("the right to receive ideas is a necessary
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political
freedom") (emphasis in the original).
52 See LoMonte, supra note 47, at 118 ("[P]olitical competency is best acquired by practicing the messy, often difficult, process of democracy. Students are less apt to gain political skills,
values, and knowledge from sitting on the sidelines."); Joseph Kahne et al., Redesigning Civic
Education for the Digital Age: Participatory Politics and the Pursuit of Democratic Engagement,
44 THEORY & RsCH. IN Soc. EDUC. 1, 4 (2016).
53 Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools, 48 wAIF
FOREST L. REV. 211, 212 (2013).
54 See LoMonte, supra note 47, at 116 ("Teaching the Constitution in the abstract, but
devaluing it in practice, breeds cynicism and creates a sense of civic futility . . . at a formative
time in [students'] development").
55 2017 ABA Res. 119B & Rep. to the House of Delegates, https://splc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/1570_abaresolution_119bandjreporto.pdf (calling for enactment of state and
local legislative policies protecting student journalists' right "to make the independent editorial
judgments necessary to meaningfully cover issues of social and political importance without fear
of retaliation or reprisal").
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effect.5 6 This is precisely what happened in August 2020 when two

North Paulding High School students in Georgia were suspended for
posting images of mask-less students crowding their school hallways
during the COVID-19 pandemic to bring attention to the public
health risk.57 Word of the school's retaliatory action rapidly spread,
generating national media coverage that was highly critical of the
school's response. In the face of this negative publicity, North Paulding administrators rescinded the suspension of at least one of the
students. 58 However, many more instances of school censorship,
including student journalists' self-censorship for fear of administrative
reprisal, never receive such curative sunshine.
B.

Georgia Case Study: Student Press Freedoms Before and After
Hazelwood

Decided eight years before Hazelwood, the Georgia case of
Reineke v. Cobb County School District demonstrates the Tinker standard's efficacy in protecting scholastic media from administrative cen-

sorship.59 Yet if adjudicated post-Hazelwood, the court in Reineke
would necessarily have afforded far more deference to school officials'
editorial choices regarding the school newspaper. Reineke is therefore a useful case study for comparing student press freedoms before
and after Hazelwood.
Reineke involved multiple acts of censorship by both the
McEachern High School principal and journalism adviser concerning
two issues of the "Arrowhead" school newspaper. In the first issue,

the adviser deleted content about new instructors' attitudes towards
56 Mario Cacciottolo, The Streisand Effect: When Censorship Backfires, BBC (June 15,
2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-18458567 (reporting that media headlines resulted when a
school tried to prohibit a student from posting photographs of school meals and rating their
nutritional value online). The Streisand Effect is named after American entertainer Barbara
Streisand whose 2003 attempt to suppress photographs of her residence in Malibu, California
resulted in increased public attention. Streisand Effect, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Streisand effect (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
57 Dahlia Lithwick, In the Pandemic, Students' Free Speech Rights Are More Important
Than Ever, SLATE (Aug. 7, 2020), https://slate.comltechnology/2020/08/north-paulding-corona
virus-suspension-free-speech.html.
58 Lateshia Beachum, Georgia School Reverses Suspension of Teen Who Shared Viral
Photo of Hallway Packed with Students, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/08/06/georgia-teens-shared-photos-maskess-studentscrowded-hallways-now-theyre-suspended/.
59 484 F.Supp. 1252, 1255-58 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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"homosexual teachers," and replaced a single use of the word "damn"
with the word "darn."" The principal then confiscated the entire
newspaper issue out of concern that it contained photographs
reprinted without permission, a potentially libelous article, and
alleged errors in statistics, spelling, and grammar. 61 The principal was
also uncomfortable with the content of several other pieces in the
issue.62 In the following issue of the "Arrowhead," the journalism
adviser deleted two articles: one about the principal's confiscation of
the prior issue, and one deemed to be improper editorialization on the
paper's sports page. 63 After the student co-editor-in-chief's father

threatened litigation over the "Arrowhead" issue that had been confiscated, the principal suspended the paper's publication entirely and

replaced it with a literary magazine.'
Based on this series of events, the "Arrowhead" co-editor-inchief sued for violation of his First Amendment rights. The federal
65
district court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with him.
The court's analysis relied heavily on "[t]he Tinker standard of material and substantial disruption as has been applied by ... this circuit, in
cases involving student publications."" The court found that the
Tinker standard did not justify the adviser's "excis[ing] possibly controversial material in the name of improving an article's appearance"
and removing a single use of the word "damn." 6 7 Errors in statistics,
grammar, or spelling were held to be insufficient reasons to permit
infringement of students' free speech rights as "these faults are not the
sort which would lead to a significant disruption of the educational
process." 6 8 The court further reasoned that concerns of potential copyright infringement or libel did not justify discarding the entire news60 Id. at 1258.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1259-60. As just one example, the principal forecasted that one article referencing
the previously segregationist stance of a current Board of Education member would adversely
affect race relations in the school. The court held that this prediction lacked supporting evidence.
Id. at 1260.
63 Id. at 1260.
64 Id. at 1261.
65 Reineke v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 484 F.Supp. 1252, 1262-63 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
66 Id. at 1256-57.
67 Id. at 1258 ("[S]tudent expression may not be prohibited solely because of disagreement
with its content"); see also Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021) ("[T]he
school itself has an interest in protecting a student's unpopular expression....").
68 Reineke, 484 F.Supp. at 1258.
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paper issue but could instead be addressed by delaying publication to
consult with legal counsel. 69
Meanwhile, the court rejected the school's desire to suppress controversial content, noting that "it should be axiomatic at this point in
our nation's history that in a democracy 'controversy' is, as a matter of
constitutional law, never sufficient in and of itself to stifle the views of
any citizen." 70 The court further criticized deleting the article about
the principal's confiscation of the prior "Arrowhead" issue because it
constituted "straightforward news reporting of an incident which

would be of no small importance to the faculty and students" at the
school and there was "no reasonable basis . . . to predict that a substantial disruption of school activities would be caused by its publication." 71 Finally, the court found no justification for the principal

replacing the paper with a literary magazine when faced with the possibility of a First Amendment lawsuit. 72 The court therefore enjoined
the principal and journalism adviser from prohibiting or interfering
with the future publication or distribution of the paper, and from censoring or imposing prior restraint on its content. 73
Georgia courts have not subsequently disavowed Reineke's full-

throated defense of student press freedoms. However, post-Hazelwood, at least some of the McEachern High School administrators'

rationales for editing or deleting student articles would necessarily
have been accepted by the court. This is because Hazelwood specifically allows a school, acting as a publisher of a student newspaper, to
disassociate itself from speech that is "ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced" 74 and to "exercis[e]
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities." 75 Hazelwood even goes so far
69

Id.

70 Id. at 1259 (quoting Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist, 462 F.2d 960, 971 (5th Cir. 1972)).
71 Id. at 1260-61.
72 Id. at 1261 ("The court fails to understand how the plaintiff's actions in resorting to the
courts in an attempt to vindicate his First Amendment rights would justify a further abridgement
of those rights by the school authorities.").
73 Id. at 1262-63 (noting the following exceptions where prior restraint would be allowed:
obscene to minors, libelous, reasonably likely to cause substantial disruption or material interference with school activities or student or faculty rights, and where no other means could be
employed to prevent such disruption or interference).
74 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
75 Id. at 273.
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as to identify "political controversy" as a legitimate reason for schools
to disassociate from and censor their students. 76
Moreover, unlike Tinker, which requires proof of reasonably predicted or actual disruption or material interference before a school

can censor, Hazelwood provides no appreciable check on administrators' editorial whim.77 Thus, if Reineke were decided today, the school
would likely be permitted to delete articles with spelling, grammatical,
and statistical errors as well as articles relating to new instructors' general attitudes about "homosexual teachers," race relations, and the
principal's confiscation of an entire prior issue of the "Arrowhead"

paper. The Reineke court repeatedly relied on Tinker's "material disruption" standard in rejecting these actions by school administrators,
but Hazelwood strips away that protection. 78
Hence, legislative action is urgently needed at the state level to
restore the Tinker standard for student journalists. 79 Until such pro-

tections are passed, administrators will continue to exercise their discretion to prevent students from reporting on timely and relevant
issues that the school deems too political, controversial, or unflattering to the school. For instance, in January 2021, several Georgia high
school journalists from different schools reported being censored from
writing about the Black Lives Matter movement. 80 Moreover, inter
views we conducted with two Georgia high school journalists during
the Fall 2020 semester revealed that, in the absence of free-speech'
protections, they were voluntarily self-censoring to avoid ruffling
administrative feathers. Specifically, one student from an Atlanta
76 Id. at 272 ("A school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech
that might reasonably be perceived . . . to associate the school with any position other than
neutrality on matters of political controversy.").
77 Kozlowski, supra note 12 (finding that in the twenty-five years following Hazelwood,
First Amendment claimants almost always lost once Hazelwood was found to apply, because
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" is interpreted so loosely as to be meaningless).
78 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73 ("[w]e conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker
for determining when a school may punish student expression need not also be the standard for
determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of
student expression.").
79 Cf Christine Snyder, Reversing the Tide: Restoring First Amendment Ideals in America's
Schools Through Legislative Protections for Journalism Students and Advisors, 2014 B.Y.U.
Enuc. & L.J. 71 (2014) (advocating for federal legislative protections for the speech rights of
student journalists).
80 These accounts were contained in entries submitted for the 2021 Georgia Scholastic
Press Association's First Amendment essay contest, for which the authors of this article served
as judges.
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suburb stated that he and his peer journalists "try to please" administrators and that avoiding offense is generally "an unspoken rule,"
reinforced by a "very hands on" adviser. 81 He stated that it was

understood that subjects to be avoided included flags, politics, Bible
quotes, and "anything contentious." 2 Likewise, a student editor-inchief from a different Georgia high school reported that she and her
student colleagues choose to self-censor rather than risk reprisal for
covering hot button issues, like politics or race. She noted that it

would be a concern to publish a story "if it reflects poorly on the
[school's] administration."8 3
Despite the classic muckraking role of journalists to challenge
institutional leaders, neither of the foregoing students evinced anything but respect and acceptance of their school administrators'

authority. This is not surprising given that school officials in Georgia
and the majority of other states have wielded final editorial control
over scholastic media for longer than the students we interviewed
have been alive. However, their lived experiences illustrate that student journalism post-Hazelwood is being shaped more by a desire to
keep the peace than by a commitment to robust reporting. 84 Ultimately, these students' experiences highlight the need for statutory
free-speech protections if scholastic journalists are to have their own
voice, particularly when they seek to express minority viewpoints.85
For instance, the aforementioned student editor-in-chief described
that "[b]eing in a majority liberal leaning school, when we present
opposing viewpoints ... things can become slightly controversial and
our publication can receive backlash for the published content." 86
State-level speech and press protections are essential to help empower
student journalists to candidly express and explore under-represented

81 Interview with Anonymous Student No. 2, over Zoom (Sept. 29, 2020).
82

Id.

83 Interview with Anonymous Student No. 1, over Zoom (Sept. 23, 2020).
84 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (allowing schools to censor
student media "in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a student newspaper, unless one
believes that the purpose of the school newspaper is to teach students that the press ought never
report bad news, express unpopular views, or print a thought that might upset its sponsors").
85 See LoMonte, supra note 47, at 117 ("[s]tudent media provides an outlet for people with
minority perspectives and contrarian views to feel heard" yet Hazelwood allows schools to suppress this "counter-majoritarian ethic").
86 Interview with Anonymous Student No. 1, over Zoom (Sept. 23, 2020).
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Media Advisers at Risk of Retaliatory Employment Action
Public school teachers who serve as media advisers to scholastic

journalists are also adversely impacted by Hazelwood because it limits
advisers' ability to advocate for their students' rights. This phenomenon was displayed in California where, prior to 2008, the state's student-press-freedom law did not cover scholastic media advisers.
School administrators would then "lean on" the advisers to control
the content of their students' work which the administrators themselves could not directly censor. 88 In marshalling support to amend
California's law to encompass advisers, advocates pointed to examples
of teachers who had been terminated after their students' published
89
articles that were critical of their school's administration. These cautionary tales exemplify the very real employment risks that media
advisers face post-Hazelwood when they refuse to acquiesce in censoring student press freedoms.
The Supreme Court's public-employee-speech doctrine further
compounds the risks for public school media advisers who stand up
for their students' speech and press rights. As announced in Garcettiv.
Ceballos, public employees receive no constitutional protection if they
are fired or otherwise retaliated against for their job-related speech
because the First Amendment does not "shield[ ] from discipline the
90
expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties."
Thus, a media adviser who speaks out against administrative censorship of her students has no recourse under the First Amendment if she
is subjected to adverse employment action, including termination, for
taking this position.
87 See Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Inside Voices: Protecting the Student-Critics in Public
Schools, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 253, 259 (2012) (urging protection of students' freedom of speech
because "respect for social critics ensures that minorities participate in self-governance, incorporating potentially alienated outsiders into the body politic and diversifying the knowledge base
for public decision-making").
88 Jeff Pelline, Opinion, Retaliation Against Teachers a Concern, UNION (Mar. 28, 2008),
https://www.theunion.com/opinion/jeff-pelline-retaliation-against-teachers-a-concern.
89 Id. (citing examples of California advisers being removed for: allowing a paper to publish
an editorial criticizing random searches on campus; publishing content critical of the administration's not letting students stand up in the bleachers during basketball games; and running editorials critical of school bathrooms, food, and an unavailable teacher).
90 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).

78

CIVIL RIGHTS LAw JOURNAL

[Vol. 32.1

Garcetti theoretically left some breathing room for public-

employee speech to the extent it intersects with concepts of academic
freedom, but this has proven of little use to public school teachers in
Georgia and other states where courts have chosen not to recognize
this exception. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted in Garcetti that
it was not then deciding whether its newly announced rule excluding
job-related speech from the First Amendment's ambit "would apply in
the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching."9 1 This judicial caveat has led to inconsistent lower court
decisions on whether to recognize an academic-freedom carve out to
Garcetti'sholding that official-duty, public-employee speech is unpro-

tected by the First Amendment. 92
But state and federal courts in Georgia have yet to recognize such
a carve out in the K-12 context. For instance, in Lamar v. Clayton

County School District,93 the federal district court comprehensively
summarized Garcetti without referencing any possible exception for
academic freedom, and relied on Garcetti in finding that a special education teacher's speech was unprotected. 94 In Atwater v. Tucker, the

Georgia Court of Appeals quoted Garcetti for the proposition that a
middle school teacher could be suspended so long as her speech "has
some potential to affect the [school's] operations," with no mention of

any special consideration for academic freedom. 95 Thus, at the end of
the day, public school teachers in Georgia and elsewhere who act in
their official role as media advisers have no First Amendment
91 Id. at 425.
92 Compare, e.g., Blasi v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 00-CV-5320 (RRM) (MDG), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113798, at *98-99 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2012) (acknowledging that the academicfreedom exception is an "open question" but finding that the Second Circuit applies Hazelwood
to advisers anyway), with Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07cv783 BEN (LSP), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107665, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2008) (stating that "Garcetti by its own terms
does not extend to the public school setting" due to the academic-freedom exception).
93 No. 1:13-CV-1600-HLM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186886 (N.D.Ga. 2014).
94 Id. at *50.
95 343 Ga. App. 301, 308 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). See also Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d
755, 761-62 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying Garcetti without mentioning a potential academic freedom
exception; financial aid counselor alleged retaliation for speaking about potential fraud within
her department but claim failed because she was acting pursuant to her official responsibilities).
Cf. Hubbard v. Clayton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (denying application of Garcetti because the plaintiff assistant principal was speaking in his capacity as a union
leader); Leslie v. Hancock Cnty. Sch. Dist., 994 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1351 (M.D. Ga. 2014) (finding
that school administrators were speaking in their private capacity, with no reference to a Garcetti
academic-freedom exception).

2021]

RESTORING STUDENT

PRESs

FREEDOMS

79

recourse if they suffer retaliation for defending their students' speech

and press freedoms. 96
Advisers are all too aware that their advocacy on behalf of students may be futile and may also result in adverse employment consequences. One Georgia adviser interviewed during the Fall 2020
semester recounted that she endured backlash in the form of coldshoulder treatment and negative regard from school administrators
after she voiced opposition to the principal's censorship of the 2020
April Fool's edition of the student newspaper. 97 She reported that the
April Fool's edition had been published in prior years with a "fake
news" banner at the top. But in 2020, the issue was abruptly cancelled
a week before going to press because the principal felt it was inappropriate given the seriousness of the then-unfolding COVID-19 pandemic. 98 The adviser believed that only her high degree of
professionalism and expertise as a former working journalist prevented the administration from engaging in more overt retaliation

against her.99
The adviser explained that this was not the first time the administration had censored her students' work.10 0 Previously, a student's
opinion piece was cut that focused on officials' investigation into students' use of cloud-based storage to share non-consensual pornography of other students. 01 The adviser also relayed that her students
had experienced administrative pressure to put a positive spin on
events they reported.10 2 She expressed frustration at her inability to
103
shield her students from this editorial interference.
96 Indeed, the Georgia State Board of Education's Standards of Excellence implicitly
endorse adviser censorship by calling on journalism advisers to guide their students in producing
"content that meets professional and community standards (as defined by Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier 1988)." Ga. Dept. of Educ., Georgia Standardsof Excellence: Teacher Guidance Document Journalism, Standard ELAGSEJ.RW2 (Aug. 2019), https://www.georgiastandards.org/
Georgia-Standards/Documents/Journalism-Teacher-Guidance-for-Research-and-Writing.pdf
(last visited August 13, 2021). Thus, advisers who object to curtailing their students' press freedoms to the full extent authorized by Hazelwood may find themselves sanctioned for poor job
performance.
97 Interview with Anonymous Adviser No. 1, over Zoom (Sept. 23, 2020).

98

Id.

99 Id.
100 Id.
101
102

Id.

Id.
103 Interview with Anonymous Adviser No. 1, over Zoom (Sept. 23, 2020).
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As astutely observed by one former student journalism advisercome-lawyer, protecting the First Amendment rights of student journalists will remain "an imperfect solution if school officials can still
take advantage of the loophole in the law and censor indirectly- by
threatening and pressuring faculty advisors [sic] to influence and control content."10 It is therefore essential that legislative safeguards for

scholastic press freedoms extend to scholastic media advisers as well
as student journalists.
ANALYSIS

I.

STATE LAWS REDRESSING HAZELWOOD'S HARMS

Before Hazelwood, California presciently enacted a law in 1977
that protected student speech and press rights at public high

schools.1 05 In reaction to Hazelwood, five additional states enacted
similar laws between 1988 and 1995.106 A relative drought in new legislation followed. In 2000, SPLC introduced its model student-pressfreedoms statute (hereinafter "SPLC Model").107 Between 2007 and
2018, the number of states with protective legislation doubled to fourteen.1 08 Although none of the fourteen state statutes are identical,
there are many common elements between them, especially those

informed by the SPLC Model. This section considers the core provisions of the fourteen statutes, as well as some of their notable variations, and examines how courts have interpreted and applied them.
Snyder, supra note 79, at 98.
105 CAL. EDuc. CODE § 48950. Also, in 1977, California enacted protections for speech on
community college campuses. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 76120. In 1992, California adopted what is
known as "Leonard's Law" that expanded protections to students at private high schools, and
was later amended to include students at both public and private colleges and universities. CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 66301, 94367.
106 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (1988); IOwA CODE ANN. § 280.22 (west 1989); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120 (1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7211 (1992); and ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 6-18-1201 (West 1995).
107 SPLC Model Legislation to Protect Student Free Expression Rights, STUDENT PRESS L.
CTR., https://splc.org/2000/07/student-press-law-center-model-legislation-to-protect-student-freeexpression-rights/ (last updated February 2020).
108 OR. REV. STAT. § 336.477 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.077 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15.1-19-25 (2021); ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1 et seq. (2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-121 (west
2016); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-109-1 et seq. (2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 28A.600.027 (West
2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 1623 (2020).
104
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Public vs. Private Schools

Twelve of the fourteen state statutes protect student speech and
press freedoms only in public secondary schools (i.e., middle and high

schools) and sometimes in public post-secondary institutions (i.e., colleges and universities), but not in private schools.

The SPLC Model

includes private school students in its definition of "student journalist,"1 9" but only Rhode Island and California have similarly taken this
approach.110 California, however, exempts private schools controlled
by religious organizations."1 The other twelve state statutes are limited in application to public schools.
B.

Defining What Expression Is Protected
1.

Student Speech Generally vs. Student Journalism in Specific

With minor variations, thirteen of the fourteen state statutes
explicitly protect student press freedoms in school-sponsored media,
meaning media that is created under the direction of a schoolemployed media adviser and/or that is supported financially by the
school or created through the use of school resources.1 1 2 California,
Colorado, and Rhode Island go even further to explicitly protect student speech in non-school-sponsored media.11 3
Twelve of the fourteen state statutes designate student journalists
as responsible for determining the content of their media, with Massachusetts and Arkansas being the only two exceptions. 14 And ten of
SPLC Model, supra note 107, at Definitions Section (2).
§§ 48950(a); 66301; 94367(a); 16 R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-109-2. Rhode
Island also uniquely protects elementary school students.
111 CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 48950(c); 66301; 94367(c).
112 Massachusetts is the one state whose statute does not specifically mention student
media or student journalists. However, it does state that student's general "[f]reedom of expression shall include without limitation, the rights and responsibilities of students, collectively and
109

110 CAL. EDUC. CODE

individually . . . (b) to write, publish, and disseminate their views." See MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN.

ch. 71, § 82. Arguably, this language is broad enough to also protect student press freedoms.
Meanwhile, in addition to Massachusetts, four other statutes also contain protections for students' free speech generally, independent of whether it occurs in the context of student media:
California, Iowa, Colorado, and Nevada.
113 See CAL. EDuc. CODE § 48950(a); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120(1); 16 R.I. GEN.
LAws § 16-109-3(a); accord SPLC Model, supra note 107, at Operative Section (a). Nevada's
statute refers only to "pupil publications" without specifying whether they are school-sponsored
or not. NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.077(3).
114 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1201 et seq.; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 82.

[Vol. 32:1

CIvIL RIGHTS LAw JOURNAL

82

the fourteen statutes provide that school boards must adopt rules and
regulations consistent with the statute, typically in the form of a writ-

ten policy that is distributed to students and sets forth reasonable
time, place, and manner provisions for students engaging in schoolaffiliated expressive activities." 5

2.

Specific Forms of Expression and Topics That Are
Enumerated as Protected

California's statute, which is the oldest, enumerates specific forms

of protected student expression - i.e., "the use of bulletin boards, the
distribution of printed materials or petitions, the wearing of buttons,

badges, and other insignia, and the right of expression in official publications." 1 16 Massachusetts, which has the second oldest statute, takes a
more general approach declaring that its students have the right "(a)

to express their views through speech and symbols, [and] (b) to write,
publish, and disseminate their views."1 17
The later SPLC Model more narrowly protects "freedom of
speech and freedom of the press in school-sponsored media" and, in

turn, defines "school-sponsored media" to include "any material that
is prepared, substantially written, published or broadcast, in any

media, by a student journalist."11 8 Multiple states mirror this model
language11 9 while Nevada simply protects all "expression" by student

journalists.1 20
Colorado provides a cautionary tale regarding the need to define
the protected forms of school-sponsored media with some specificity.
Colorado's 1990 statute contained broad language declaring that students in public schools "shall have the right to exercise freedom of
speech and of the press." This provision was narrowly construed by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2009 to apply only to written
student publications.12 1 The court reasoned that: (1) various provi115 All but Massachusetts, North Dakota, Kansas, and Illinois. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 71, § 82; N. D. CENT. CODE § 15-10-55; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7211; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
80/1 et seq.
116 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907(a).
117 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 82.
118 SPLC Model, supra note 107, at Definitions Section (1); Operative Section (a).
119 See, e.g., 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/5
§§ 28A.600.027(7)(a), 28B.10.037(1).
120 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.077(1)-(2).

et

seq.;

WASH.

REV.

CODE

121 Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1235 (10th Cir. 2009).
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sions of the statute referenced written publications, and (2) the legislative history indicated an intent to undo the impact of Hazelwood on
student newspapers. 122 To cure this restrictive interpretation, the Col-

orado statute was subsequently amended to protect students' freedom

123
of speech and press "whether printed, broadcast, or online."
As for enumerated topics of protected speech, Kansas and Vermont both prohibit suppression of political or controversial content in
school media, and Vermont further prohibits suppression of content
that is critical of the school's administration.12 4 Kansas's contentbased protection was upheld in M.C. ex rel. Chudley v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512.125 There, the school district singled out student journalists for disparate treatment, requiring them to
return to the school building during a walkout protest over school gun
violence, while other students were generally permitted to remain

outside.1 26 A school official also confiscated one student journalist's
school-issued camera. 127 The court found that the plaintiff students
had pled a viable private-right-of-action claim against the school district for violating Kansas's student-press-freedom statute because the
statute specifically protects student journalists who are reporting on
controversial or political subject matter.128
3.

Prior Restraint

The SPLC Model prohibits "prior restraint" of student publications, meaning that students cannot be prohibited in advance of publication from writing about a particular topic based on school
29
The fourteen state
administrators' dislike or discomfort with it.1

statutes are evenly divided seven-to-seven as to whether they explicitly prohibit prior restraint. 30
122 Id. at 1235-36.

§ 22-1-120(1).
§ 72-7211(a); VT.

123 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.

STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 1623(f).
125 363 F.Supp.3d 1182 (D. Kan. 2019).
126 Id. at 1192.
127 Id. at 1192-93, 1202.
128 Id. at 1210-12.
129 SPLC Model, supra note 107, at Operative Section (c). See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ("[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.").
130 Iowa, Colorado, North Dakota, Maryland, California, Illinois and Vermont all prohibit
prior restraint. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.22(3); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120(1); N.D.
124 See KAN. STAT. ANN.
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Statutory Grant of Authority and Protection for Media Advisers

Eleven of the fourteen state statutes authorize scholastic media
advisers to teach or supervise student journalists, and to "maintain" or
"encourage" professional standards of English and journalism. 13 1
Only Massachusetts, Arkansas, and Vermont lack any grant of authority to advisers. 2
In addition to defining advisers' general scope of authority, several states charge advisers with the affirmative duty of protecting their
students' free expression. For instance, California mandates that
advisers "maintain" (i.e., uphold) the student-speech protections set

forth in the California statute. 133 Iowa requires media advisers to
ensure "compl[iance]" with its "New Voices" law.1 34 Maryland, meanwhile, prohibits advisers from influencing student journalists to pro-

mote the official position of the county board or public school.13

5

Such provisions empower advisers to prioritize the free-expression
rights of their students over the edicts of school administrators. However, even with a statutory mandate to defend students' speech rights,

media advisers are not always free agents. For example, a California
court held that a school district could require a journalism adviser to

censor profane content in a student publication, against the adviser's
will, because the adviser had a concomitant statutory duty to uphold
"professional standards of English and journalism." 136
Nine of the fourteen state statutes prohibit school administrators
from retaliating against advisers based on their students' speech, and
Rhode Island uniquely grants advisers a right to sue if this protection
§ 15.1-19-25(4); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-121(f)(1); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 48907(d); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 1623(f).
131 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907(c); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120(1); 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 80/10; IOwA CODE ANN. § 280.22(5); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7211(d); MD. CODE
ANN., EDUC. § 7-121(c)(2); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.077(3)(c)(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-1925(2); On. REV. STAT. § 336.477(3); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-109-3(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN,
§ 28A.600.027(1); accord SPLC Model, supra note 107, at Operative Section (a).
132 See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-1201-1205; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16 § 1623.
CENT. CODE

133 CAL. EDUC. CODE

§ 48907(c).

134 IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.22(5).
135 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC.

§ 7-121(e).
136 Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High Sch. Dist., 34 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1306 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
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is violated. 137 In contrast, Iowa, Massachusetts, Arkansas, Oregon,
and Illinois do not explicitly protect scholastic media advisers against
retaliation.1 38 However, this does not necessarily mean that advisers

in those states have no recourse.
For instance, the Iowa Court of Appeals in Lange v. Diercks
ordered that an adviser's personnel file be expunged of reprimands
that resulted from allowing students to publish an April Fool's edition
of the school paper over the administration's objection.139 Even
though the Iowa statute does not prohibit retaliation against advisers,
the court reasoned that statutory protections for student speech would
be eroded if the school district could punish an adviser for allowing
student expression that is protected by the statute to proceed.140
Lange reinforces that effective legislative protections for student journalists require complementary protections for their advisers, and
weighs in favor of making those protections explicit in any studentpress-freedoms statute.

D.

Students' Remedies if Rights Are Violated

Only four of the fourteen state statues grant students a right to
sue if their speech rights are violated: California, Oregon, Rhode
Island, and Washington.141 All four states authorize declaratory and
injunctive relief, and Oregon also allows for a paltry $100 in money
damages.1 42 While the Kansas statute contains no explicit right-to-sue,
a court nonetheless found this right to be implied where: (1) there
were no other enforcement mechanisms outlined in the statute, (2) the
legislative history demonstrated support for the protection of student
137 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907(g); COLO. REV. STAT ANN. § 22-1-120(9); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 72-7211(d); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC § 7-121(h)(2); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.077(3)(c)(2);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-25(2); 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-109-3(e), (h); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16
§ 1623(h); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.027(1).
138 See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-1201-1205; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80 et seq.; IOWA CODE
ANN. § 280.22; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 82; OR. REV. STAT. § 336.477. While Arkansas
has no direct protection against retaliation, it requires school boards to work with advisers to
adopt rules and regulations consistent with the Act. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-1202. This may
provide advisers the opportunity to negotiate for their own protection under the school boards'
rules.
139 2011 WL 5515152, at *12 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

140 Id.

141 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(b); O.R.S. § 336.477(5); 16 RI. GEN. LAWS § 16-1093(h); WASH. CODE Rev. ANN. § 28B.10.037(4).

142 Id.; OR. REV. STAT. § 336.477(5).
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journalists, and (3) "other states with similar statutes have allowed for
private rights of action to proceed."14 3
Additionally, California and Washington authorize a court to

award attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff.

144

Such fee-shifting

increases the likelihood that private attorneys will be willing to litigate
to enforce the rights created by the student-press-freedoms statute,

and makes it possible for non-wealthy plaintiffs to obtain legal
assistance.

E.

Disclaiming School Responsibility

Half of the fourteen state statutes disclaim school responsibility
for protected student speech. For example, Massachusetts declares:
"[1] No expression made by students in the exercise of [their] rights

shall be deemed to be an expression of school policy and [2] no school
officials shall be held responsible in any civil or criminal action for any
expression made or published by the students." 145 Similar disclaimers
are found in Nevada, Vermont, Iowa, Arkansas, North Dakota, and
Illinois. 14 In Lange v. Diercks, the Iowa Court of Appeals emphasized the need for schools to distance themselves from student speech,
observing that "[i]n its rebuff of Hazelwood, our legislature wanted to
ensure student publications in Iowa were free to convey a position at
odds with the school's official stance." 147 Clearly articuating that the
views expressed by the students are not the school's views paves the
road for school officials to take an appropriately hands-off approach
to scholastic media.
F.

Categories of Unprotected Speech
Categories of student expression that are commonly unprotected

under the existing state statutes include: (1) libel or slander; (2)
obscenity; (3) unwarranted invasion of privacy; (4) harassment or bul-

lying; and (5) expression that causes or creates danger of "material
143 M.C. ex rel. Chudley v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 363 F.Supp.3d
1182, 1211 (D. Kan. 2019).
144 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(b); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.10.037(4).
145 MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82.
146 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-18-1203(b)(2)(A); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/20; IOwA
CODE ANN. § 280.22(6); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.077(3)(d); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-25(6);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1623(j).
147 2011 WL 5515152, at *1, *8 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (internal quotations omitted).
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and substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school" (the
Tinker standard).14 While most states grant school administrators
discretion to censor expression falling within these unprotected categories if they so choose, 149 California and Iowa go a step further by
affirmatively prohibiting speech that falls within any of the exempted
categories.15 0
Drilling down further on these commonly exempted categories,
every state exempts libel or slander except for Massachusetts and
15 2 with
Nevada."1 Ten of the fourteen states also exempt obscenity,
Vermont further allowing prohibition of content that is "gratuitously
profane." 153
Arkansas was the first state to exempt unwarranted invasions of
privacy in 1995.154 With the exception of Nevada,1 5 5 every subsequent
state to adopt a student-press-freedoms law has followed Arkansas's
lead (i.e., Oregon, North Dakota, Washington, Illinois, Vermont,

Maryland, and Rhode Island).
In 1992, California exempted student speech that constitutes harassment, threats, or intimidation, unless it is otherwise constitutionally
protected. 15 6 Every subsequent state to adopt a protective statute followed suit except for Oregon and Illinois.1 57 Nevada also excludes
from protection expression that amounts to "cyber-bullying or
158
intimidat[ion]" as those terms are defined by the statute.
And, of course, each of the fourteen state statutes incorporate
some version of the Tinker standard, allowing schools to punish or
prohibit student speech if school authorities reasonably forecast that it
will cause substantial disruption or material interference with school
148 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-19-25(3)(d).
149 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7211(c) ("Publication

or other expression that is
libelous, slanderous or obscene or [breaks or promotes breaking the law] or [disrupts] school
activity is not protected by this act.") (emphasis added).
150 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48907(a) ("[E]xpression shall be prohibited which is obscene,
libelous, or slanderous. Also prohibited shall be material that so incites pupils."); IOwA CODE
ANN. § 280.22(2) ("Students shall not express, publish, or distribute any of the following: [listing
prohibited categories]").
151 Compare, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., EDUC. § 7-121(d)(1), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.077.
152 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7211(c).
153 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1623(e)(3).
154 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-1204(3).
155 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 388.077(2), (5).
156 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48950(d).
157 See OR. REV. STAT. § 336.477; 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/15.
158 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.077(2), (5).
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activities.159 Kansas and Vermont's laws most closely mirror the
Tinker standard. 160 In contrast, Massachusetts dilutes the Tinker
standard, allowing schools to intervene if student expression causes
"any disruption or disorder." 1 61 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
interprets "any disruption" to require more than "trivial or merely
negative reactions to an unpopular viewpoint," but to also include, as

Tinker does, "prospective" disruption that is reasonably forecast.1 62
The other eleven state statutes strengthen the Tinker standard,
treating it as a floor for protection, rather than a ceiling. California
and Nevada remove "material interference" and only exempt speech
or scholastic journalism content that substantially disrupts. 163 The
remaining nine states1 " exempt speech or expression only if it causes
both "material" and "substantial disruption," or "clear and present
danger" of the same. 165 Echoing the Supreme Court's language in

Tinker, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington require administrators to base any forecast of disruption "on specific facts ... and not on
undifferentiated fear or apprehension." 166
Finally, some states include additional categories of unprotected
expression. For example, Colorado's statute declares that "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to limit the promulgation or enforcement of lawful school regulations designed to control gangs." 167
Rhode Island includes an exception for advertising products that are
159 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1988).
160 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7211(c) ("creates material or substantial disruption of the normal
school activity"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1623(e)(6) ("creates the imminent danger of materially or substantially disrupting the ability of the school to perform its educational mission").
161 See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, § 82.
162 Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F.Supp.2d 98, 111 (Mass.
2003) (finding no reasonable likelihood that disruption would result if religious student group
was allowed to distribute candy canes at school with an accompanying religious message, during
non-instructional time); see also Pyle v. Sch. Comm., 667 N.E.2d 869, 872-73, 873 n.3 (Mass.
1996) (violating dress code by wearing a vulgar T-shirt was not sufficient to show "disruption or
disorder" under the state statute).
163 CAL. EDUC. CODE

§

48907(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §

388.077(3)(c)(1).

Rhode Island, Washington, Oregon, North Dakota, Maryland, Colorado, Arkansas,
Iowa, and Illinois.
165 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120(3)(d). The phrase "clear and present danger" that some states have adopted appears in the SPLC Model and strengthens Tinker's
requirement that predictions of disruption be reasonably forecast. SPLC Model, supra note 107.
166 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1988); OR. REV.
STAT. § 336.477(4)(d)(C); 16 R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-109-3(b)(4); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
28A.600.027(2)(f)(iii).
167 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-120(8).
164
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unlawful for minors to purchase. 168 And Washington uniquely
exempts from protection expression that violates the Federal Communications Act and related regulations.1 69
In sum, the great majority of the fourteen existing state statutes
explicitly protect the speech and press rights of student journalists in
school-sponsored media at public schools and many also protect student media advisers. The existing statutes largely require that students
control the content of school-sponsored media and half prohibit
school administrators from engaging in prior restraint of media content. Half of the statutes also disclaim school officials' endorsement of
or liability for the content of school-sponsored media. The statutes
almost all recognize that certain categories of student speech are not
protected, or are even prohibited. And most importantly, they all
restore a version of the Tinker standard for when student journalists'
speech can be censored or punished.

II.

RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS FOR ANY STATE CONSIDERING A
"NEW VOICES" LAW

The SPLC Model provides a blueprint that many states have
adopted, in whole or in part, to safeguard student journalists and
advisers from administrative censorship. Drawing on the SPLC
Model's success, as well as innovative variations in individual state.
statutes and the case law interpreting them, we endorse the following
components for future "New Voices" legislation.
A.

Preamble

An introductory preamble ensures that those who will later be
interpreting and applying the statute correctly construe both the letter
and spirit of the law. The preamble should recognize the importance
of free expression for all students, and declare the legislature's intent
to restore and protect student journalists' right to free speech and a
free press that were stripped away by Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier. The
preamble should also specify the legislature's intent to safeguard
media advisers from employment retaliation when they act in support
of student journalists' rights codified by the bill. Finally, the preamble
168 See 16 R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-109-3(c).
169 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.027(2)(g).
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should state that the bill is not to be construed as narrowing the
already-existing protections under the United States Constitution, and
the state's own constitution if applicable, for student expression in
contexts outside of school-sponsored media.
B.

Scope: Which Schools Are Covered
A "New Voices" bill must specify which schools are covered

including, at a minimum, public high schools, and preferably also public middle schools, colleges, and universities. Ideally, the bill would
extend to private schools as well, but to date only two states have
adopted this approach.
C.

Definitions

A "New Voices" bill should define its key operative terms such as
"school-sponsored media," "student journalists," and "student media
adviser," making sure that the terms capture not only print publica-

tions but broadcast and digital media as well. We also recommend
defining "school officials" who are subject to the law to include any
district or school employee. This makes clear that not only top administrators are prohibited from infringing student speech and press
rights, but also all other school employees. We further recommend
defining the terms "censor" and "prior restraint" for purposes of the
operative sections of the bill.
D.

Operative Sections

The operative sections of a "New Voices" bill should clearly enumerate the rights it protects; the exceptions to those rights; obligations
it creates for school officials; and enforcement mechanisms.
1.

Enumerated Rights

The bill should declare protection for students' exercise of freedom of speech and of the press in school-sponsored media. It should
state that student journalists cannot be punished for exercising their

rights under the bill.
The bill should provide that student journalists are responsible
for determining the content of school-sponsored media and that
school officials, including media advisers, may not censor or engage in
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prior restraint of content, unless it falls within one of the limited
exceptions set forth in the bill. We also recommend following the
examples of Kansas and Vermont in stating that student journalists'
expression cannot be suppressed based solely on the content being
political, controversial, or critical of the school or its administration.
This will put school officials explicitly on notice that such topics are
protected and also provide affirmative assurance to students that they
need not self-censor. However, the bill should include a disclaimer
that no student expression in school-sponsored media shall be deemed
to be an expression of school or district policy, and that no school
officials shall be liable for student journalists' protected expression in
school-sponsored media except to the extent that the expression has
been altered by the school officials.
The operative sections should also provide that student media
advisers may teach professional standards of English and journalism
to student journalists but may not be retaliated against in their
employment for acting to protect, or for refusing to infringe upon, the
free-speech and free-press rights of student journalists that are codi-

fied by the bill.
2.

Exceptions to Enumerated Rights

Limited exceptions to student journalists' protected speech and

expression should include: (1) libel or slander, (2) obscenity, (3)
unwarranted invasions of privacy, (4) expression intended to threaten,
harass, haze, or bully another student; and (5) expression that creates
a "clear and present danger" of commission of: an unlawful act, violation of a lawful school policy, or a "material and substantial disruption" of school operations. As several states have already done, the
bill should require school officials to base any prediction of "disruption" on specific facts rather than on "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension."
3.

Obligations and Enforcement

The bill should require school officials who interfere with the
content of school-sponsored media to clearly identify, in writing,
which of the bill's enumerated exceptions for protected speech they
are invoking. Proponents of the bill should consider whether to also
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require that school officials provide censored students with a timely
opportunity to appeal any administrative interference.
The bill should require school districts to work with student

media advisers to adopt written student-speech and student-press policies in accordance with the bill, and to make copies of those policies
readily available to students, parents, and school officials. Finally, the
bill should include a private right of action authorizing students and
advisers to seek declaratory or injunctive relief for violation of their
rights created by the bill. We also recommend authorizing a court to
award attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff, which two states have
already done. Otherwise, enforcement will largely be limited to plaintiffs who can afford to retain an attorney.
An example bill that includes each of these elements - i.e., pre-

amble, definitions, scope, and operative provisions - is included at the
end of this article.
CONCLUSION

Student journalists play a vital role both in their school communi-

ties and in the broader world of investigative and editorial journalism,
where the number of professional news outlets continues to shrink.
Participating in scholastic journalism also prepares students to be critical thinkers capable of wide-ranging, open discussion of contemporary
political and social issues. It requires that they learn to recognize, and
hopefully value, reliable sources of information that are well-sourced
and fact-checked. It provides students with opportunities to practice
responsible and ethical investigation and to write about complex and
sensitive issues. And it gives students a forum for articulating underrepresented positions and perspectives, across the political spectrum.
All of this, in turn, equips student journalists to be civically engaged
adults in our participatory democracy. 170 Additionally, when students
are free to report and editorialize on events and issues they care
about, this enriches the free flow of information to readers. The public

benefits from hearing what students, who will be our future leaders
and policy makers, have to say. 171
170 See 2017 ABA Res. 119B & Rep. to House of Delegates, https://spic.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/1570_abaresolution_119b_and_reporto.pdf; Nicholas V. Longo, Christopher
Drury & Richard M. Battistoni, Catalyzing Political Engagement: Lessons for Civic Educators
from the Voices of Students, 2 J. POL. Sci. EDUc. 313, 315 (2006).
171 LoMonte, supra note 47, at 120-21.
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But student journalists' freedom of expression has been tenuous,
at best, since Hazelwood. While student speech outside of schoolsponsored media continues to receive First Amendment protection
under Tinker, a student writing for the school paper has no constitutional recourse if half their article is cut, or if their school-sponsored
news broadcast is cancelled, because the school does not like what
they have to say. Hazelwood and the public-employee-speech doctrine leave media advisers with no recourse if they are retaliated
against for encouraging student speech or for objecting to its suppression. To counter these harms, the national "New Voices" movement

advocates for statutory protections at the state level to ensure that
neither student journalists nor their advisers "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 172
Fourteen states, to date, have passed legislation codifying these pro-,
tections and restoring student press freedom, with active campaigns in
many others.1 73 We encourage all states to join these ranks by passing
a "New Voices" Act that protects scholastic journalists and their
advisers from censorship and retaliation, and once again places student journalists' speech on equally protected footing with other stu-

dent expression.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1988).
See New Voices, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., https://splc.org/new-voices (last visited July
28, 2021).
172
173
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Example "New Voices" Bill.
Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "[State] New Voices
Act."
Preamble.
(1) The legislature finds that:
(a) freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press, is a fundamental principle in our democratic
society granted by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution [and by State Constitution, if applicable];

(b) a robust and free student press is critical to the development
of informed and civic-minded adults;
(c) since the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood v.
Kuhlmeier (1988), students in [State] who participate in schoolsponsored media are denied the right to full and free expression;
(d) public-school teachers in [State] who defend student journalists' freedom of expression do so at great professional risk; and

(e) [State] public-school students, teachers, and administrators
benefit from the clear delineation of student journalists' speech

and press rights.
(2) It is the intent of the legislature to restore and protect freedom of
expression for student journalists at public middle schools, high
schools, and secondary charter schools, and at public institutions of
higher education in this state, and to protect the employment of the
teachers who appropriately support these rights.
(3) This Act focuses on protecting students and advisors' speech in the
context of school-sponsored media. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as narrowing the protections that exist under the United States
and [State]'s constitutions for student speech and expression in con-

texts outside of school-sponsored media.
Definitions.

As used in this Act:
(1) "School-sponsored media" means any material that is prepared,

substantially written, published or broadcast, in any media, by a student journalist at a public middle school, high school, secondary char-
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ter school, or institution of higher education where the material is

created under the direction of a student media advisor and distributed
or generally made available to members of the student body. School-

sponsored media does not include media intended for distribution or
transmission for classroom purposes only.
(2) "Student journalist" means a student at a public middle school,
high school, secondary charter school, or institution of higher education, who gathers, compiles, writes, edits, photographs, records, or
prepares information for inclusion in school-sponsored media.
(3) "Student media adviser" means an individual employed,
appointed, or designated to supervise or provide instruction relating
to school-sponsored media.
(4) "School official" means any district or school employee or

administrator.
(5) "Censor" means to alter or remove the content of school-spon-;

sored media.
(6) "Prior restraint" means to prohibit publication, distribution, or
broadcast of school-sponsored media.
Student journalists' freedom of expression.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this Act, a student journalist has the right to exercise freedom of speech and freedom of the
press in school-sponsored media. This includes the right to convey
information and ideas through the use of words, images, and symbols
in print, broadcast, online, and other forms of school-sponsored
media. Subject to subsection (c) of this Act, student journalists -are
responsible for determining the content of school-sponsored media.
Student media advisers may teach professional standards of English
and journalism to student journalists consistent with this subsection,
but shall not censor or engage in prior restraint of students' expression
except as consistent with subsection (c).
(b) A student journalist may not be disciplined for exercising his or
her rights in accordance with this Act.
(c) This Act does not authorize or protect expression by a student
journalist that:
(1) Is libelous, slanderous, or obscene;
(2) Constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy;
(3) Is intended to threaten, harass, haze, or bully another stu-

dent; or
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(4) Creates a clear and present danger of: the commission of an
unlawful act on or off school premises; the violation of a lawful school or district policy; or material and substantial disruption of school operations. School officials must base any
forecast of material and substantial disruption on specific

facts and not on undifferentiated fear or apprehension.
(d) School officials shall not censor or engage in prior restraint of
material prepared by student journalists for school-sponsored media

except as consistent with subsection (c).
(e) School officials shall have the burden of identifying, in writing,
their justification consistent with subsection (c) for any censorship or
prior restraint of material prepared by a student journalist for schoolsponsored media [and must afford students a timely opportunity to

appeal the officials' decision].
(f) Student journalists' expression in school-sponsored media shall not

be censored or subjected to prior restraint solely because it involves
political or controversial subject matter or is critical of the school or

its administration.
(g) A student media adviser may not be dismissed, suspended, disciplined, reassigned, transferred, or otherwise retaliated against for:
(1) Refusing to infringe on conduct that is protected by this Act

or the First Amendment to the United States Constitution [or
State Constitution, if applicable]; or

(2) Acting to protect a student journalist engaged in permissible
conduct under subsection (a) of this Act or the First Amendment to the United States Constitution [or State Constitu-

tion, if applicable].
(h) Each school board and institution of higher education subject to
this Act shall work with one or more student media advisers from
their respective school district or institution to adopt a written policy
that is in accordance with this Act for student journalists' exercise of
the right of free speech and free press in school-sponsored media.

[The policy must include a provision allowing for the timely appeal of
decisions made by school officials pursuant to subsection (c) of this
Act.] Copies of the policy must be made reasonably known and available to students, parents, and school officials.
(i) No expression made by student journalists in the exercise of their

free speech and free press rights codified by this Act shall be deemed
to be an expression of school, school district, or institutional policy.
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No school official shall be held responsible in any civil or criminal
action for any expression made or published by student journalists,
unless the school official has interfered with or altered student expression, and then such official shall only be responsible to the extent of
the interference or alteration.

(j) Students and student media advisors afforded rights under this Act
may enforce those rights by commencing a civil action for declaratory
and/or injunctive relief. Individuals who prevail in seeking to enforce
their rights under this Act may recover from their opponent(s) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

